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Marine reserves and gear restrictions are common forms of marine resource management; they impact
on fishers both directly and indirectly. In 2003 New Zealand set net fishers were required to abandon set
netting along a substantial section of the North Island′s West Coast in order to eliminate the chance of
entangling the critically endangered Maui′s dolphin. A study of some 100 set net fishers, found that the
immediate, and short term effects of the 2003 set netting area closures had little impact on the catch and
effort levels of fishers. Participation in the fishery increased immediately prior to the restrictions and
remained at a similar level for the following four years. Incumbent fishers performed better than new
entrants and exiters. Trends in Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) prices appear not to have been affected
by the set net restrictions.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1 The restrictions, which have been signalled for some time, prohibit all set
netting in the Manukau Harbour west of Puponga Point (Cornwallis), to a point1. Introduction and literature review
Maui′s dolphin (Cephalorhynchus hectori maui), is a sub-species
of the Hector′s dolphin and is found on the West Coast of the
North Island of New Zealand, and is endemic to New Zealand. It is
the world′s smallest and rarest dolphin. A 2012 study commis-
sioned by the New Zealand Department of Conservation (DOC)
estimated an extant population of only 55 Maui′s dolphin [1]. This
resulted in the Maui′s dolphin being listed as critically endangered
by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)—the
highest risk category set by IUCN for wild species.
The Maui′s dolphin swims close to shore, often in water less
than 20 m deep and generally swim in pods of several dolphin [1].
Because of the precariousness of the Maui′s dolphin′s survival, the
Ministry for Primary Industries is attempting to prevent human-
induced deaths of the dolphin. Deaths from entanglement (and
consequent drowning) in set nets have been implicated as one
cause of mortality for the Maui′s dolphin. Although prevention of
this cause of mortality is unlikely on its own to make the
difference between survival and extinction, it is a factor that can
be mitigated through restriction of set net use [2].
1.1. Objectives
Commercial set netting restrictions along sections of New
Zealand′s coast were introduced in October 2003 in an attemptll rights reserved.
þ64 9 815 4563.to prevent deaths to the critically endangered Maui′s dolphin. This
study examines the short-to-medium term impact that the 2003
set netting restrictions have had on commercial set net fishing
along the West Coast of the North Island (WCNI). (Recreational set
netting had been banned previously).
Various approaches are used to assess the impact of the
restrictions on members of the industry. The first focus is a
comparison of the number of set netters operating in the WCNI
fishery, the level of fishing effort, and catch landings prior to, and
after the implementation of the restrictions. Secondly, trends in
the volume of fish landed by set netting are examined by
comparing the level of fishing effort and catch prior to 2003 with
the level after 2003.
On 3rd October 2003 the Ministry of Fisheries (now part of the
Ministry for Primary Industries) published a press release [3]
which set out the perimeters of the closure area, and the rationale
for the measures1 —in essence, explaining that dolphins needed to
surface regularly to breathe and that a dolphin entangled in a set
net would drown. This closure amounts to approximately 2400
square kilometres of sea. An obvious concern was how fishers,
using the set net method, would be affected by the closure. Now,0.5 nautical miles north of Kauri Point (eastern end of Big Bay), and then to Kauri
Point. Commercial set netting is now prohibited within four nautical miles of the
coast from Maunganui Bluff (north of Dargaville) to Pariokariwa Point (north of
New Plymouth).
Abbreviations
ACE Annual Catch Entitlement
CELR Catch Effort Landing Return
DV Deemed Value
LFR Licensed Fish Receiver
QMS Quota Management System
SA Statistical Areas
SNCELR Set Netting Catch Effort Landing Return
WCNI West Coast of the North Island
Fish species
BAR Barracouta (Thyrsites atun)
FLA Flatfish (includes: (New Zealand sole, novaezeelandiae;
Greenback flounder, Rhombosolea tapirina; Black
flounder, Rhombosolea retiaria; Brill, Colistium
guntheri, Lemon sole, Pelotretis flavilatus; Turbot, Colis-
tium nudipinnis)
GMU Grey Mullet (Mugil cephalus Gonorynchus forsteri & G.)
GUR Gurnard (Chelidonichthys kumu)
JDO John Dory (Zeus faber)
KAH Kahawai (Arripis trutta)
SCH School Shark (Galeorhinus galeus)
SFL Sand Flounder (Rhombosolea plebeian)
SNA Snapper (Pagrus auratus)
SPD Spiny Dogfish (Squalus acanthias)
SPO Rig (Mustelus lenticulatus)
TAR Tarakihi (Nemadactylus macropterus)
TRE Trevally (Pseudocaranx georgianus)
WAR Warehou (Seriolella brama)
YBF Yellowbelly flounder (Rhombosolea leporina)
YEM Yelloweye Mullet (Aldrichetta forsteri)
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assess its impact.
This study considers the overall impact of the set netting
restrictions on the industry; it does not assess how the restrictions
have impacted individual fishers, and therefore does not assess the
full social and economic cost associated with the 2003 set net
restrictions. Neither does it make an assessment of the effective-
ness of the set net ban in limiting deaths of Maui′s dolphins.
Therefore the study is not a cost-benefit analysis of the set net
measures; however, it does provide an overall view of how the
restrictions have impacted this region of the fishery.
The study seeks to establish if there has been a change in
fishing effort or catch connected to the 2003 set net ban.
The 2003 set net restrictions, along the WCNI, fall within the
bounds of six distinct Statistical Areas (SA) (041, 042, 043, 044, 045
and 046) (see Fig. 1).2
The area covered by the set net restrictions comprises a small
portion of the overall area encompassed by the six Statistical Areas
(as per Fig. 1 Depth and Set Net Prohibition). In SA 041, 042, 045 or
046, fishers wishing to continue using set nets would be required
to either fish beyond the four nautical mile coastal strip, or shift
their operations North or South of the banned area. In areas SA
043 and 044 (the Manukau and Kaipara harbours) the restrictions
require fishers to move further into the harbour avoiding the
harbour mouth where restrictions apply.2. Methodology
Using the 2003 set net closures as the locus for analysis, a time
series analysis is used to examine patterns of participation and
behaviour pre- and post-closure. Data was extracted from the
Ministry of Fisheries databases and the following data series were
obtained:(i)2
fisher
MinisPort Price Data from 1997 to 2007;
(ii) Catch Landing Returns 2000–2007 from set netting;
(iii) Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) trades and values.Statistical Areas have been designated for the entire New Zealand inshore
y and are used by fishers to report their catch and by the New Zealand
try for Primary Industries for recording and classifying catch data.In essence, this data represents all of the available information
from 2000 to 2007 for the WCNI fishery affected by the set netting
closures. Some 58,782 lines of data are included in the analysis.
Contained within the summary of Catch Landings, a detailed
record of all Catch Landing reports filed, was the following
information;(i) Fisher numeric identifier (note: does not give a fisher′s actual
identity);(ii) Species codes;
(iii) Inshore Statistical Area (SA);
(iv) Year and month;
(v) Primary fishing method;
(vi) Vessel key.Commercial fishing effort and catch returns are required from
all commercial fishers operating in New Zealand’s fishery. The
Catch Effort Landing Return (CELR) is a general-purpose return and
is submitted on a trip-by-trip basis to record the fish take by
species and method employed.
There are several types of Catch Effort return forms; however,
for many fishing methods, such as set netting, a method-specific
template is overlaid on the standard CELR, enabling fishers to
provide the required information. In this way, a ‘Set Netting Catch
Effort Landing Return’ (SNCELR) is created.
Catch data is a visual estimate of the catch, both target species
and bycatch species, made by fishers as they haul in each catch.
Effort data states the method used by the fisher, and the species
targeted.
In the case of set netting, fishing duration, mesh size, and total
length of nets hauled in the day would be required. Landings data,
recorded on Catch Landing returns, provide an accurate record of
the quantity of target species and bycatch landed. Landings data is
more accurate than Catch data but lacks the temporal (time of
catch) and spatial (latitude and longitude) detail of the Catch
estimate. Catch Landing returns are the primary data source used
in this report. As indicated in Fig. 1, the set net prohibition area is
generally a small portion of the overall Statistical Area and there-
fore without spatial resolution it is not possible to establish from
the Catch Landing return data the level of catch occurring solely in
the banned area prior to the 2003 set netting ban.
The first step in establishing the level of set netting effort was
to identify the overall number of set netters operating in the
Statistical Areas (SA) associated with the WCNI set netting ban.
Fig. 1. Depth and set net prohibition.
J. Stewart, P. Callagher / Marine Policy 42 (2013) 210–222212Secondly, an individual SA was selected for certain aspects of
comparative analysis. The SA chosen was SA 043, defined by the
Manukau harbour. It was chosen because it was an important set
netting fishery.
By examining returns filed by the combined SA it is possible to
identify an increase or decrease in direct effort.
The study also examines trends on a species level. Total kilo-
grams caught of all species combined could be determined
through the summing of all catch data reported. While this was
prima facie a simple case of establishing trends in market growth
or contraction pre- and post-closure, it would not provide an
accurate comparison as some species and sub-species were not
required to be reported until part-way through the study period.
Also, it did not demonstrate the impact that the closures might
have on fishers who target only one or two species. This was
overcome by including a measure of the kilograms caught for each
species and also by determining the average number of species
caught by fishers.
Trends in revenue from set netting are an important predictor
of entry or exit. It also helps to assess the financial success and
stability of incumbents. Revenue has been measured by using
landing volumes and port price.
Port prices are set by the Ministry of Fisheries based on survey
data received from licensed fish receivers. Port prices remain the
same each year unless fishers make submissions to have themrevised. Port prices are used by the Ministry of Fisheries as the
basis for cost-recovery levies; therefore, as a general pattern, port
prices remain at a discount to the actual wholesale price received.
However, while port prices may not equal the true wholesale
market price, they do provide a stable benchmark indicator of
revenue from total catch. For the purpose of homogeneity and
comparability over the study period, port price is selected as the
market price substitute in order to determine total revenue from
the set net fishery over the combined SA. In Section 3.8 of the
Findings an indicative sample of actual Licensed Fish Receiver
(LFR) prices, obtained from industry sources, is reported to provide
a comparison with port price.
Given that certain species may be difficult to catch by alter-
native methods, such as hook or trawl, landings by species are
examined to establish any impact on individual species. This was
carried out for the sixteen species recorded by fishers on their
Catch Landing reports. Some species are in fact sub-species of a
main species. For example, Flounder could potentially include
Sand Flounder (Rhombosolea plebeia), Yellowbelly Flounder
(R. leporine), Greenback Flounder (R. tapirina), Black Flounder
(R. retiaria) and Turbot (Colistium nudipinnis), which is caught by
trawling. A similar situation exists for Mullet and Dogfish. While
this level of detail may seem unnecessary it is noteworthy that the
habitat for sub-species will differ, making some more easily
targeted by set netting.
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Fig. 2. Set netter participation in combined SA from 2000 to 2007.
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Fig. 3. Total kilograms landed per annum in combined SA.
J. Stewart, P. Callagher / Marine Policy 42 (2013) 210–222 213Entry to and exit from New Zealand′s commercial fishery is a
phenomenon that has been studied since the inception of the
Quota Management System (QMS) in 1986. In general, the number
of quota owners is declining for most species in the QMS [4,5].
However, the number of fishers operating with an Annual Catch
Entitlement (ACE or catch share) in the inshore fishery has
increased, compared to the number when the ACE regime was
introduced in 2001 [6].
Entry and exit activity in the set netting fishery should be
considered in the context of the ongoing trends within the overall
inshore fishery; some variability in the nature and extent of
participation in this segment of the fishery would be expected.
Both whole-time and part-time fishers would be present in the
fishery; some may come and go (enter, exit and re-enter), thus
becoming transient fishers. Also, given the relatively low capital
cost associated with set netting operations, entry would be easier
from the perspective of cost. The absence of economies of scale in
set netting would limit motivation for quota accumulation, and
suggest stability in set netter participation rates. Exit would also
be relatively costless (due to low sunk cost), especially if vessels
were kept for recreational use.
To establish trends in entry, exit, and participation, the overall
population of set netters was examined using fishers′ numeric
keys (an anonymous entry code). Entry and exit behaviour was
also studied for SA 043 as a comparison with the overall WCNI set
netter participation patterns.
To establish trends in landing Productivity and Portfolio Values,
a sample of 80 fishers was extracted from the overall population of
set netters using fishers’ numeric keys. The sheer volume of data
meant that it was not feasible to analyse in detail the complete
population of WCNI set netters. However, the sample size con-
stitutes about one-third of all set netters and was chosen after
stratifying the set netters by size.
The same sample was used to establish various measures of
landing Productivity and Portfolio Values using both volumes and
revenue across the various participation categories: Entrants,
Exiters, Transients, and Whole-timers.
Finally, an assessment of the relationship between ACE price
and pre- and post-closure time periods was made in order to
determine if closure had impacted on the market price of ACE for
the species targeted by set netters. It would be expected that
falling profitability due to rising costs (such as fuel) would result in
reduced demand for ACE and consequently a fall in ACE price.3
In assessing the impact of the set net ban on set netting activity,
care must be taken to avoid the tendency to assume causation; a
decline in set netting post-closure may, or may not, be the result of the
closure. However, by using the range of measures (effort, landings by
species and in aggregate, set netter participation, catch landing
revenue, entry and exit behaviour, and ACE price for relevant species)
a composite picture is developed that makes it easier to reach a
reliable conclusion. This is especially true if all indicators point in the
same direction, which appears to be the case in this study.3. Findings
Commercial set netting fishing Effort and Landings in the
Statistical Areas relevant to the WCNI fishery were extracted from3 Given that New Zealand fish markets commonly have a large number of
readily substitutable fish species on sale throughout the year, it would be expected
that the price elasticity (responsiveness) of demand for any given species of fish
would be high, meaning that a reduction in supply of any given species would not
drive price significantly higher for that species. Consequently, without higher
return for the species the demand for ACE in the species would not be driven up
either.the Ministry of Fisheries Catch Effort database to provide the basis
for the following findings.
3.1. Set netter participation levels WCNI
Fig. 2 indicates the number of fishers who filed Catch Returns
using the set net method, in the six Statistical Areas combined, for
the years 2000–2007. The results show an increase in set net usage
from 2000–2002 with a pre-closure peak in 2002 at 29% over the
2000 levels. The increase in the number of participants from 2000
to 2001 coincides with the introduction of the ACE regime in 2001.
The ACE regime provides easier access to catch shares and thereby
facilitates participation in the fishery [6,7]. Following closure, the
level of participants has steadied at an average of 108 set netters,
and there has been an increase in the aggregate number of fishers
over the 2000 level of 3.
3.2. Total catch volume of WCNI set netting
Fig. 3 indicates that between 2000 and 2001, the number of
kilograms caught using the set net method of fishing increased by
194.5%. From 2001 to 2007 the amount of fish caught remained
within a band from 3–13% under or over the 2001–2007 average of
966,061 kg (average variation 7%).
Fig. 3 demonstrates a slightly increasing trend (using a two-
year moving average) in catch levels using the set net method in
spite of the set net closures introduced in 2003.
3.3. Total revenue from WCNI set netting
Total revenue from the set netting method in the six Statistical
Areas was calculated by multiplying the volume (kilograms) landed
of each species, by price received by fishers (Table 1). Port prices
Table 1
Total revenue of set net landings using port price.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
$606,797 $1,641,506 $1,629,468 $2,483,196 $2,564,186 $2,439,043 $2,228,805 $2,548,075
$606,797 
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Fig. 4. Total revenue of landing using port price.
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netting catch.4
After increasing from 2000 to 2004, overall aggregate revenue
peaked in 2004–2005 and has subsequently remained relatively
stable and well above the pre-2003 levels of revenue. A detailed
breakdown of the composition of the aggregate revenue by year
and species is supplied in the Supplementary Material to this
report (available in the online version).
3.4. Volumes landed by species
Further analysis of the aggregate set net data by species
highlights some interesting changes in reporting patterns over
the study period, particularly with respect to volumes caught.
In spite of the relative stability in total revenue since 2003 (see
Fig. 4), the data in Table 2 show that from 2003 to 2004 certain
species were landed in smaller numbers (FLA, GMU) while others
were landed in greater numbers (SPD, SNA, TRE, WAR).
Of note, however, is SCH which had a lower catch landed in
2004 but since then, landings have increased well in excess of the
pre-closure levels.
Using these wider, though contestable classifications, it is also
feasible to consolidate the Mullet and Dogfish species sub-codes.
This would mean that the Mullet categories, on average, have
higher catch levels post-closure, reducing the number of species
that have seen a decline in landings to 3 out of 12 (25%) while the
Dogfish categories continue to have a lower combined catch
average, albeit by only 4134.20 kg (2.37%)—see Fig. 6 showing
the decline in SCH immediately after the closure with subsequent
recovery, possibly indicating a short-term impact of the closure on
fishing for this species.
Table 2 also indicates that species SNA, TRE and TAR, have had
fluctuating Catch Landing levels over the study period, but being
high-value species, they make substantial contributions to the4 Port price data is collected at a stock level through an annual survey of the
greenweight price a fisher receives from a LFR. There are several limitations to the
port price survey: Survey replies may be skewed where respondents are aware that
the survey results are a factor in determining cost recovery levies, commodity
charges from industry organisations, and deemed values. Also, the survey does not
differentiate between all species in a fishstock. For example one price is given for
different species, such as; YBF (yellowbelly flounder), SFL (sand flounder), FLA
(flatfish) but this classification covers a number of Greenback flounder, Black
flounder, Brill, Lemon sole, and Turbot—which all sell at a different price but there
is only one port price [8].gross revenues of set netters. See Figs. 5 and 6 for trends in volume
—shown in higher and lower volume groupings.
3.5. Pre- and post-closure average volumes by species
By examining pre- and post-closure four-year averages of
volumes landed (see Table 3), it can be seen that only 7 of the
15 species (40%) (excluding BAR) have recorded averages smaller
than those of the pre-closure period. If further consolidation of the
flatfish codes (FLA, SFL, and YBF) were to be taken into account,
then the number of species for which an average decrease
occurred declines to 4 out of 13 species (30.7%).
It is possible that some set netters were operating mostly
within the five harbours prior to the restrictions being put in place.
The data reported does not provide sufficient spatial resolution to
indicate the extent to which fishers have moved catch effort
within a Statistical Area; it would only show movement between
Statistical Areas, such as a shift from SA 042 into SA 043.
The ban on set nets includes a large proportion of the region′s
shallower waters (50 m or less). This potentially impacts the
ability of fishers to target species found primarily at these depths,
such as the Yellowbelly flounder ((YBF) (see Fig. 7 Distribution of
Yellowbelly flounder). Although most WCNI set netters appear to
target a range of species, the shallow-water habitat of the Yellow-
belly flounder may cause fishers of that species to become
specialists rather than generalists, and thereby make them more
vulnerable to area closures [9]. As indicated in Fig. 5, Yellowbelly
flounder landings did decline post 2003.
Set netters in areas such as SA 045 (see Fig. 1 Depth and Set Net
Prohibition), where the ban covers much of the shallower water,
were likely to have been impacted more by the ban. Moving
further out to sea could potentially be an issue for fishers using
small vessels, and for those that did venture into deeper water, the
species located in shallower water habitats could no longer be
targeted.
3.6. Entry and exit in the set net fishery
It is evident that individual fishers using the set net method of
fishing within the study area have responded differently to the
closures. Table 4 indicates that from 2000 to 2007 only 54 fishers
reported landings in every year. While 51 fishers exited the fishery
and did not re-enter, there were 68 new participants in the set net
fishery. By far the largest group of participants were those referred
to as ‘transient’. Transient participants are those who entered AND
exited the set net fishery on one or more occasions.
That fishers developed strategies and tactics in response to the
area closure, in order to maintain or increase catch rates is not
unexpected. Salas and Gaertnar [10] point out that fishers develop
dynamic fishing tactics and strategies as an adaptive response to -
among other things—regulatory constraints. The ability of fishers
to transfer effort across species, method and geographical location
would depend on the extent that fishers had a generalist versus
specialist approach. Smith and McKelvey [9] point out that gen-
eralists mix a number of activities, minimising variable cost which
allows ease of entry and exit. In contrast, specialists typically
operate in only one fishery, making transition to another fishery
costly.
Table 2
Kilograms landed by species.
Species 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BAR 24 102 29 154 9 84 39 95
FLA 80889 216284 140386 182330 170259 146877 134052 122948
GMU 48263 52003 56598 55469 49940 50042 50367 50542
GUR 10797 32816 27048 18363 16966 13937 18036 19918
JDO 86 907 488 438 260 456 495 1130
KAH 9270 52913 81626 52255 34708 45505 33448 48965
SCH 20657 195741 176650 179782 91578 211185 209852 251523
SFL 512 3920 4564 1807 2139 1031 1887 1293
SNA 6866 7924 11954 10914 9299 13829 6203 16761
SPD 43 5309 3028 2875 18540 16015 17502 4474
SPO 121054 126320 124039 123886 139551 137026 138513 125485
TAR 63 593 552 617 740 457 533 961
TRE 17081 25054 46881 22406 24888 33057 21895 34127
WAR 3514 1059 24637 2588 15605 31095 15734 27614
YBF 30582 162569 86026 130728 118325 96051 82370 71860
YEM 84 3824 8419 7290 1761 1863 2188 2363
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Fig. 5. Total volume landed by species (Group One).
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Table 3
Pre- and post-closure averages of volumes landed.
Average 2000–2007 Average 2000–2003 Average 2004–2007
BAR 67.00 77.25 56.75
FLA 130538.25 78112.78 182963.73
GMU 192477.10 158760.95 226193.25
GUR 19734.98 22255.80 17214.16
JDO 532.48 479.70 585.25
KAH 44836.11 49015.73 40656.49
SCH 167120.88 143207.38 191034.38
SFL 2144.16 2700.95 1587.38
SNA 10468.58 9414.38 11522.79
SPD 8473.20 2813.65 14132.75
SPO 164135.90 171862.55 156409.25
TAR 564.50 456.25 672.75
TRE 28173.57 27855.18 28491.96
WAR 15230.75 7949.50 22512.00
YBF 97313.70 102476.03 92151.38
YEM 3473.95 4904.18 2043.73
5 Compliance costs were reported as one of the most consistent reasons for
fishers exiting the fishery [12]
J. Stewart, P. Callagher / Marine Policy 42 (2013) 210–222 215The following series of Tables 5–7 show each segment of
participants by year. The data in Table 5 shows that most of the
departures of Exiters occurred in 2001, with 2004s figure a close
second. In total 51 fishers exited in the period 2000–2006.
Considering the exit data alone, the impact of the WCNI set net
closure is unclear. Given that 25 exited prior to 2003 and 22 exited
after 2003, it is not possible to conclude that the closure had a
major impact on exit decisions.
Table 6 presents trends in entry to the set net fishery. New
entrants are weighted towards the most recent years of the time
series, with 51 of the 68 entries occurring after 2003 and with a
notable jump in 2007, suggesting that incentives to participate in
the set net fishery exist.
Table 7 indicates that the number of transient participants
peaked in 2002 and that their number has been in steady decline
in every year after that.Appendix B, using a sample of the transient set net fishers,
illustrates typical patterns of entry and exit.3.7. Landings portfolio revenue analysis
Entry and exit into any industry are generally determined by
profit opportunities or the lack thereof. This is likely to be true in
the case of the set net fishery. While various other factors may also
influence fishers’ participation in the industry.5 it is argued that
cost and revenue play significant roles in decision making, as they
do in many commercial activities. Pradhan and Leung′s [11] study
of entry and exit decision in the Hawaiian long-line fishery,
established that profitability was a key determinant of fishers
decisions to exit or remain in the fishery. Therefore by determining
the landing-revenue analysis for a mix of participant portfolios it is
possible to determine whether the propensity for entry or exit is
associated with average revenue per landing. In the absence of
actual cost data, average revenue per landing is used here as an
approximate measure of performance.
The following series of Tables 8–11 provide actual cost revenue
results for a sample of participants in each of the market
participation segments (i.e. Whole timers, Entrants, Exiters, Tran-
sient fishers).
Fig. 7. Distribution of yellowbelly flounder.
Table 4
Segmentation of participation.
Whole time 54
Exiters 51
Transient 127
Entrants 68
Table 5
Year of exit.
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of exiters 5 12 8 4 10 6 6
Table 6
Year of entry.
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number of entrants 9 5 3 9 7 10 25
Table 7
Summary of transient participants.
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number of transient
participants
9 47 53 50 39 33 19 8
J. Stewart, P. Callagher / Marine Policy 42 (2013) 210–222216Using port prices as the most consistently recorded standard
over the study period, Table 12 shows that Whole-time fishers
generally outperform Exiters and Transient fishers in terms of
average revenue per landing. Such a finding is in line with that of
[13], who concluded that substantial variations in profitability and
revenue exist in fisheries where ‘some fishermen seem to perform
consistently better than others’. In line with conventional thinking,
Exiters had markedly lower gross portfolio revenues, and Entrants
outperformed Whole-timers only in 2005 and 2007. This finding is
consistent with [14], which explains wide variation in catch
among fishers operating with a given fishery, and [11] which
investigated entry and exit decisions within Hawaii′s longline
swordfish and tuna fishery.
When considering trends in average gross portfolio revenues after
2003, the level of this measure for Exiters showed no significant
decline and therefore is in line with the general finding above that exit
was more or less consistent over the study period. It is also evidentthat the average annual gross portfolio revenue for Whole timers
generally improved after 2003, suggesting no apparent impact of the
closure.
Table 8
Portfolio value from set netting—whole time.
Average
no. of
landings
Average
species
reported
Average
vessels
used
Average annual
gross portfolio
revenue
Average
revenue per
landing
2000 17.62 4.89 1.41 53602.98 1054.34
2001 67.43 5.97 1.49 134503.64 849.63
2002 71.43 6.54 1.65 202131.12 850.25
2003 63.86 5.95 1.54 193930.14 1183.69
2004 67.65 5.95 1.46 166173.40 1213.45
2005 86.14 5.78 1.46 257500.39 1084.96
2006 75.73 6.30 1.46 201950.06 1151.82
2007 81.76 6.32 1.41 258912.86 1078.18
Table 9
Portfolio value from set netting—entrants.
Average
no. of
landings
Average
species
reported
Average
vessels
used
Average annual
gross portfolio
revenue
Average
revenue per
landing
2000
2001 17.0 4.50 1.0 11617.16 540.38
2002 29.5 6.00 1.2 12978.56 472.58
2003 33.1 6.00 1.0 21594.18 685.78
2004 29.3 5.33 1.0 24569.00 768.94
2005 32.4 6.00 1.0 63630.78 1679.67
2006 47.6 6.42 1.1 29984.47 686.77
2007 44.4 6.38 1.2 54160.25 1706.74
Table 10
Portfolio value from set netting—exiters.
Average
no:
landings
Average
species
reported
Average
vessels
used
Average annual
gross portfolio
revenue
Average
revenue per
landing
2000 12.9 4.40 1.1 3705.75 267.93
2001 30.3 5.93 1.3 14881.49 447.39
2002 33.4 6.50 1.3 16023.83 435.75
2003 42.8 8.00 1.4 16867.62 422.31
2004 50.8 6.25 1.5 14266.22 275.76
2005 48.0 5.00 1.0 14233.24 575.20
2006 13.0 3.00 2.0 7930.93 610.07
Table 11
Portfolio value from set netting—transient fishers.
Average
no. of
landings
Average
species
reported
Average
vessels
used
Average annual
gross portfolio
revenue
Average
revenue
per landing
2000 3.0 2.00 1.0 154.18 55.86
2001 8.5 2.00 1.3 2528.71 242.02
2002 6.3 3.00 1.0 1454.75 230.34
2003 25.5 5.50 1.5 4491.58 194.66
2004 7.3 3.00 1.0 2345.23 277.46
2005 12.0 2.00 1.0 23685.13 1534.68
2006 7.8 2.25 1.3 4911.93 1297.24
2007 27.0 6.50 1.0 26364.28 644.39
Table 12
Comparative average annual gross portfolio revenue.
Transient fishers Whole time Exiters Entrants
2000 154.18 53602.98 3705.75 N/A
2001 2528.71 134503.64 14881.49 11617.16
2002 1454.75 202131.12 16023.83 12978.56
2003 4491.58 193930.14 16867.62 21594.18
2004 2345.23 166173.40 14266.22 24569.00
2005 23685.13 257500.39 14233.24 63630.78
2006 4911.93 201950.06 7930.93 29984.47
2007 26364.28 258912.86 N/A 54160.25
Table 13
Comparative average revenue per landing.
Transient Whole time Exiters Entrants
2000 55.86 1054.34 267.93 N/A
2001 242.02 849.63 447.39 540.38
2002 230.34 850.25 435.75 472.58
2003 194.66 1183.69 422.31 685.78
2004 277.46 1213.45 275.76 768.94
2005 1534.68 1084.96 575.20 1679.67
2006 1297.24 1151.82 610.07 686.77
2007 644.39 1078.18 N/A 1706.74
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landing” as a comparison indicates that over the study period
the Whole timers generally have higher average landing revenues.
The revenues of Exiters again are consistently lower than those of
Whole timers, whereas 2005 and 2007 were comparatively better
years for Entrants.
Table 13 reveals that the average value of revenues for
Transient fishers in 2005 and 2006. The average for these years
is the highest of their averages. Further analysis of Tables 8–11show that transient fishers consistently recorded the lowest
number of average species reported for those years, suggesting
that these fishers may target only higher-priced species at specific
times of the year in line with market demand.
3.8. Per kilogram cost revenue comparisons
While revenues are considered a major driver of participation
in most markets, cost of raw materials, as an integral component
of profit calculations, may also influence participation. In terms of
the study area the most common forms of quota acquisition are
ownership or ACE (or in cases where ACE is unavailable, Deemed
Value (DV)).
As well as representing a cost to fishers, ACE can also be viewed
as an indicator of profitability. In the ACE market for a particular
fish stock, ACE price will rise whenever the demand for ACE
exceeds the supply of ACE. A key determinant of ACE demand is
the profitability expectations associated with a given fish stock.
This suggests that if port price (revenue) for a species is constant
then a fall in ACE price would imply that fishers expected costs to
rise and thus profits to fall. If port price was to rise while ACE price
fell this would suggest that fishers expected costs to rise faster
than the increase in port price (and revenue). From Tables 14 and
15 it is evident that ACE price declined for a number of species in
2004 and recovered in 2005. By 2006–2007, average ACE price had
increased across all species.
The decline in 2004 ACE prices suggest that fishers may have
anticipated an increase in effort/costs (such as labour, fuel, and
repairs) would result from the closures. The rising ACE price in
2005 could reflect that fishers had either overestimated the cost
impact of the closures and/or that they had adopted cost-effective
strategies to cope with the closures. Alternatively, it could suggest
that port price (revenue) was rising faster than cost, resulting in
higher profits and driving up ACE prices.
Table 14 shows the trends in ACE price from 2000 to 2007 with
Deemed Value for 2005–2007 also included.
Year-on-year analyses of trends in ACE price shows that some
species have increased in cost significantly (BAR, GSH, FLA) while
others hardly at all (JDO, GUR, YEM). The average increase in cost,
using ACE, of a portfolio of these set net species is 22.8% from 2001
J. Stewart, P. Callagher / Marine Policy 42 (2013) 210–222218to 2007, which equates to an average annual increase of 3.26%.
These trends suggest that certain species (BAR, GSH, FLA) have
improving profitability. This could be explained either by a rising
port price (revenue) or by declining costs (or effort).
It should also be noted that these species are caught using a
variety of fishing methods including trawling and long lining which
would also be key drivers in the ACE market for most of these
species. A possible exception would be FLA for which the ACE price
fell immediately following closure. However, it subsequently recov-
ered to record the third-highest average growth rate since 2000.Table 14
Trends in ACE price per kilogram.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
ACE ACE ACE ACE ACE DV ACE DV ACE DV
BAR 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.10
FLA 0.31 0.34 0.63 0.29 0.76 0.79 0.31 0.79 0.67 0.94
GMU 0.61 0.61 0.61
GSH 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14
GUR 0.93 0.56 0.64 0.26 0.54 0.55 0.42 0.55 0.64 0.61
JDO 0.92 0.87 1.01 0.81 0.89 1.37 0.82 1.37 1.02 1.31
KAH 0.21 0.19 0.31 0.19 0.31 0.25 0.31
SCH 0.61 0.36 0.42 1.23 1.06 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.06 0.67
SNA 2.86 2.72 2.45 2.59 2.37 2.94 2.86 2.94 4.37 4.61
SPD 0.30 0.30 0.13
SPO 0.56 0.96 1.09 0.92 0.92 0.99 0.76 0.99 0.83 0.96
TAR 0.33 0.36 0.8 0.93 0.80 0.73 0.77 0.73 0.93 0.71
TRE 0.25 0.34 0.42 0.39 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.43 0.38 0.42
TUR
WAR 0.22 0.22 0.38 0.26 0.29 0.41 0.31 0.41 0.52 0.46
YEM 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.17
Table 15
Year-on-year percent increase in ACE prices.
BAR FLA GSH GUR JDO KAH
2001–02 75.0 9.7 300.0 –39.8 –5.4
2002–03 –14.3 85.3 25.0 14.3 16.1
2003–04 –83.3 –54.0 –46.7 –59.4 –19.8
2004–05 300.0 162.1 25.0 107.7 9.9 –9.5
2005–06 50.0 –59.2 50.0 –22.2 –7.9 0.0
2006–07 83.3 116.1 0.0 52.4 24.4 31.6
Ave (%) 68.5 43.3 58.9 8.8 2.9 7.4
Table 16
Trends in cost and price measures.
2001 2002 2003 2004 200
ACE PP ACE PP ACE PP ACE PP ACE
BAR 0.04 0.35 0.07 0.43 0.06 0.42 0.01 0.27 0.04
FLA 0.31 3.60 0.34 3.60 0.63 3.44 0.29 3.67 0.76
GMU 0.92 0.95 2.06 2.44
GSH 0.03 0.51 0.12 0.98 0.15 0.57 0.08 0.47 0.10
GUR 0.93 1.32 0.56 1.96 0.64 1.69 0.26 1.64 0.54
JDO 0.92 3.53 0.87 4.20 1.01 4.56 0.81 4.37 0.89
KAH 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.21 0.80 0.19
SCH 0.61 1.60 0.36 1.96 0.42 1.97 1.23 2.05 1.06
SNA 2.86 3.00 2.72 4.22 2.45 4.31 2.59 4.34 2.37
SPD 0.5
SPO 0.56 2.84 0.96 2.67 1.09 1.98 0.92 2.90 0.92
TAR 0.33 1.52 0.36 1.48 0.8 1.96 0.93 1.81 0.80
TRE 0.25 1.13 0.34 1.33 0.42 0.83 0.39 1.58 0.43
WAR 0.22 0.98 0.22 1.08 0.38 0.99 0.26 1.12 0.29
YEM 0.50 2.17 2.26 0.25Though this information is commercially sensitive, prices paid
by Licensed Fish Receivers (LFRs) were nevertheless obtained from
three receivers and, by agreement, averaged. These prices were
verified by seven fishers who confirmed they received revenues
within a range of 710% of the stated averages. Table 16 presents
all data obtained on prices paid and cost data (italicised).
In light of the significant difference in annual average gross
portfolio revenues listed above, the 2007 portfolios (Entrants,
Exiters, etc.) were re-analysed for gross profit margin (LFR price
—ACE cost). This analysis produced gross profit margins of
between 306% and 434%. It is important to note that the cost of
acquiring ACE is but one aspect of the calculation for gross margin
and makes no allowance for fishers’ other operating costs (fuel
costs, wages, etc.). Repeating this same analysis for 2007 to
determine a gross profit margin using Port Price (Port Price—ACE
Cost) produced gross margins of between 201% and 286%.
The significant difference between gross margin using port
price and LFR highlights the limitation of port price as an indicator
of actual revenue. This in turn makes it problematic to deduce
change in costs from trends in ACE price, especially if the port
price change from year to year is somewhat arbitrary and/or
unrelated to actual market price.
This discrepancy is also highlighted when analysing the data in
Table 17. Multiplying gross kilograms caught, using 2007 Port
Price, produced gross revenues of $2.5 M from set netting on the
West Coast North Island, whereas using the LFR average price
produced gross revenues of $4.1 M (also see Appendix A).SCH SNA SPO TAR TRE WAR YEM
–41.0 –4.9 71.4 9.1 36.0 0.0
16.7 –9.9 13.5 122.2 23.5 72.7
192.9 5.7 –15.6 16.3 7.1 –31.6
–13.8 –8.5 0.0 –14.0 10.3 11.5
–5.7 20.7 –17.4 –3.8 18.6 6.9 0.0
6.0 52.8 9.2 20.8 48.6 67.7 0.0
25.8 9.3 10.2 25.1 15.4 21.2 0.0
5 2006 2007
DV PP ACE DV PP ACE DV PP LFR
0.10 0.29 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.29 0.50
0.79 3.21 0.31 0.79 3.21 0.67 0.94 3.35 4.00
0.61 2.37 0.61 2.55 0.61 2.23 3.25
0.08 0.53 0.15 0.14 0.59 0.14 0.56 4.75
0.55 1.56 0.42 0.55 1.52 0.64 0.61 1.62 3.50
1.37 4.08 0.82 1.37 4.49 1.02 1.31 4.06 6.75
0.31 0.43 0.19 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.31 0.43 1.50
0.67 1.6 1.00 0.67 1.77 1.06 0.67 1.77 4.75
2.94 3.74 2.86 2.94 4.73 4.37 4.61 4.83 5.75
0.30 0.48 0.30 0.48 0.13 0.47 4.75
0.99 2.70 0.76 0.99 3.09 0.83 0.96 3.19 4.75
0.73 1.90 0.77 0.73 1.90 0.93 0.71 1.90 2.25
0.43 1.1 0.35 0.43 1.10 0.38 0.42 1.10 2.00
0.41 0.99 0.31 0.41 0.99 0.52 0.46 1.05 2.50
0.17 1.65 0.25 0.17 1.65 0.25 0.17 1.67 3.25
Table 17
Comparative gross revenue for set netting—WCNI.
2007 Gross Revenue Port Price 2007 Gross Revenue Port LFR
$2,548,075.20 $4,143,828.25
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The Manukau Harbour is New Zealand′s second largest har-
bour. It is made up of extensive inter-tidal mudflats covering an
area of 340 sq km (approx 131 sq mile).
The harbour mouth, which opens out to the Tasman Sea, is
2.2 km wide, and the channel 30 m deep. The large harbour area,
and narrow mouth between the Manukau Heads, creates a rapid
tidal flow, and a bar at the mouth makes navigating in or out of the
harbour dangerous. As shown in Fig. 9, the entrance to the
Manukau Harbour has been closed to set netting. This requires
fishers to move operations into the Tasman Sea, but also allows
them to move further into the harbour.
Consequently, set netters impacted by the closure of the harbour
entrance are less likely to relocate operations beyond the harbour.
4.1. Set netter participation SA 043
Statistical Area 043 (refer to Fig. 1) was analysed separately as a
comparison. Although not necessarily typical of all the Statistical35
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Fig. 9. SA 043—The MAreas within the WCNI, SA 043 is an important set net fishery The
harbour is an important nursery area for a diversity of fish species;
economically important fish species harvested from Manukau
Harbour, in order of importance are: GMU—Grey Mullet (Mugil
cephalus), flounders (Rhombosolea spp.), KAH—Kahawai (Arripis
trutta), SPO—Rig (Mustelus lenticulatus),and YEM—Yellow-eyed
Mullet (Aldrichetta forsteri), [15]—see, for example, Fig. 7 Distribu-
tion of Yellowbelly flounder.
The analysis of statistical area 043 produced a similar pattern in
the pre- and post-closure numbers of fishers reporting use of the
set net method. There was an increase from 35 to 47 participants
from 2000 to 2002, and a 34% increase in the number of set netters
by the end of the study period (see Fig. 8). The increase in
participation for SA 043 was marginally higher than for the
combined Statistical Areas.
Looking at participation numbers for SA 043, it is evident that a
small decline in set netter numbers occurred after the pre-closure
peak in 2002; a result consistent with that for the combined statistical
areas.4.2. Entry and exit behaviour in SA 043
The study of entry and exit activity was carried out for SA 043
(the Manukau harbour— see Fig. 9) in order to compare the overall
patterns of exit and entry behaviour within a single SA.
Table 18 provides the numbers of set net fishers who exited,
entered, were transient, and remained the whole time in the SA
043 fishery. It is evident that the number of ‘Whole Time’ fishers is
proportionately higher in SA 043 than in the WCNI Statistical
Areas overall (24% versus 18%). This finding suggests that Manukau
Harbour set net fishers operate as specialists—their effort invest-
ment (and resulting knowledge of the fishery) is high, and the cost
of relocating to a new fishery is too costly [9]. They fit theWattle Bay
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Table 18
Summary of movement over time—SA 043.
Category Number
Exit 15
Entrants 17
Transient 28
Whole time 19
Table 19
Comparative participant patterns—SA 043.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Entrants 5 1 0 1 0 4 6
Exiters 2 6 2 1 1 1 2 0
Transient 2 8 16 14 9 13 5 6
Table A1
Species Year Total kg Port
price ($)
Gross rev. port
price ($)
Land to
LFR
Gross Rev.
LFR ($)
BAR 2007 95 0.29 27.55 0.50 47.50
BRI 2007 9 3.35 30.15 4.00 36.00
ESO 2007 118 3.35 395.30 4.00 472.00
FLA 2007 194781 3.35 652,516.35 4.00 779,124.00
FLO 2007 41 3.35 137.35 4.00 164.00
GMU 2007 213590 2.23 476,305.70 3.25 694,167.50
GSH 2007 415 0.56 232.40 4.75 1,971.25
GUR 2007 19918 1.62 32,267.16 3.50 69,713.00
JDO 2007 1130 4.06 4,587.80 6.75 7,627.50
KAH 2007 48965 0.43 21,054.95 1.50 73,447.50
LSO 2007 12 3.35 40.20 4.00 48.00
SCH 2007 251108 1.77 444,461.16 4.75 1,192,763.00
SFL 2007 1293 3.35 4,331.55 4.00 5,172.00
SNA 2007 16761 4.83 80,955.63 5.75 96,375.75
SPD 2007 4474 0.47 2,102.78 4.75 21,251.50
SPO 2007 161361 3.19 514,741.59 4.75 766,464.75
TAR 2007 961 1.90 1,825.90 2.25 2,162.25
TRE 2007 34127 1.10 37,539.70 2.00 68,254.00
TUR 2007 103 3.35 345.05 4.00 412.00
WAR 2007 27614 1.07 29,546.98 2.50 69,035.00
YBF 2007 71860 3.35 240,731.00 4.00 287,440.00
YEM 2007 2363 1.65 3,898.95 3.25 7,679.75
1,051,099 2,548,075.20 4,143,828.25
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[16]. Movement from the Manukau Harbour would be constrained
by the natural barrier posed by crossing the often dangerous
dependent on weather and tide—Manukau bar, and then venturing
out, past the 5 mile closure area, into the Tasman Sea, and in
vessels better suited to the calmer waters of the harbour. Fishers
also use different set nets (for example, mesh size) for inner
harbour fishing, meaning that fishers would be required to acquire
new set nets to fish outside the Manukau. It seems that set netters,
impacted by the area closure at the harbour entrance, either
moved their operations further into the harbour or exited the set
net fishery. The former appears to be supported by the summary
of movement over time (see Table 18) which indicates that no
market increase in exit from the Manukau set net fishery occurred
post-closure.
Comparing patterns in SA 043 using the data in Table 19, shows
that again most entrants came to set netting in the latter part of
the time series, with exit spread over the study period. Transient
participation has also been in decline in SA 043 since 2002, as it
has in the whole WCNI.
Thus the findings for the more focused analysis (SA 043, the
Manukau Harbour) confirm the findings for the overall WCNI.5. Conclusions
Evidence from the data available on set net fishing along the
WCNI suggests there has been little impact resulting from
the 2003 set net restrictions on the industry as a whole. Participa-
tion in the set net based fishery increased early in the decade,
coinciding with the introduction of the ACE regime, and
subsequently settled at a level slightly above the pre-closure
number. A similar pattern emerged in SA 043, an important set
net fishery.
Total landings from set netting remain stable after the closure,
suggesting that overall; the industry has accommodated the set
net restrictions while maintaining landing levels.
Total revenue from landings, while subject to variations in
market forces, nevertheless indicates stability in revenue streams
from set netting.
The landings of species for which set netting is the primary
catch method have seen a decline in the post-closure period. This
is the case for Yellowbelly flounder (YBF). However, there has been
an increase in landings of other species in the post-closure period.Fishers continue to enter the WCNI set net fishery, with 35
entering in 2006 and 2007. Over the same two-year period, 12
fishers exited the industry. Participation in the WCNI set net
fishery is fluid in nature with more than 120 fishers being
transient that is, both entering and exiting at various points over
the study period.
ACE price for quota increased over the study period, suggesting
industry demand for ACE for these species remains strong.
Overall it appears that fishers have adjusted well to the
closures, but marginal fishers (perhaps represented by the tran-
sient fisher segment) appear to have been affected detrimentally.
Without catch information giving spatial resolution, deeper ana-
lysis of fisher response to set net closure is not possible. Such
information would better inform policy makers on the impact that
present closures are having on fishers, and on fishers’ ability to
accommodate any future restrictions. Such data however, is
commercially sensitive as it could disclose to rivals, and potential
entrants, where the best fishing spots are, and so undermine the
incumbents′ performance.
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Table B1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1     1 1   
2     1    
3 1  1      
4 1    1   1 
5           
6 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 
7   1 1   1  
8      1   
9  1  1     
10 1 1 1  1 1   
11  1       
12  1       
13  1       
14       1  
15   1      
16    1     
17  1 1 1 1 1   
18 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 
19  1    1   
20   1      
21  1 1      
22      1   
23 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
24  1       
25   1 1     
26 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 
27  1 1 1 1    
28     1    
29       1  
30            
31   1 1 1    
32   1 1 1 1   
33  1        
34    1     
35  1 1 1  1 1  
36   1 1  1   
37   1      
38    1     
39  1 1      
40     1 1   
41    1 1 1   
42  1 1 1     
43  1       
44     1    
45    1 1 1   
46  1 1      
47  1       
48      1  1 
49  1 1 1 1    
50    1     
Note: The blackened sections in the table below represent years in which the fisher participated in the set net fishery.
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